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The paper presents an introduction to and summary of the concept 
of alienation as found in the works of Karl Marx, from a 
developmental perspective. Five separate works, ranging from his 
early to later writings, are discussed. Tlie paper argues that Marx's 
concept of alienation is a continuous clarification and expansion of 
ideas first put forth in 1844. His development in economics 
supports and qualifies his assertions of a more philosophical nature. 
The early and later works should neither be understood as having 
complete continuity nor complete incompatibility, for the later 
grew out of the earlier. 
Beginning with the belated publicat ion of the Economic and 
Philosophie id Manuscripts oj 1844 (in German, 1939) , s tudents 
and p roponen t s of Marx have disagreed on the correct 
in terpreta t ion of this work in the context of his later writ ings. 
Central to this discussion is the deba te over the impor tance of 
alienation in the w h o l e . o f Marx's thought . Some argue that this 
concept is a philosophical appar i t ion of the young idealist still 
being persuaded by Hegel, only to be abandoned by the ma tu re , 
scientific Marx (Hook, 1962; Althusscr , 1970) . This point is 
contested by those holding that this concept is found th roughout 
Marx's writ ings (Avineri, 1968 ; McLellan, 1970) . Oi lman (1971) 
and, especially, Meszaros (1972) have dispelled the abandonmen t 
thesis al though it still exists in various forms (LeoGrande , 1977) . 
What is still lacking is a t r ea tment of alienation that clearly 
outlines a development of Marx's t hough t . Meszaros is intent on 
showing tha t alienation is a concept in each of the major works , 
but tends to sec them in an aggregate and somewhat static fashion. 
Oilman falls in to the same tendency , admit t ing that his book is 
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"a-historical." This paper presents an in t roduct ion to and 
summary of the concept of alienation as found in Marx from an 
explicitly developmental perspective. I will trace the concept 
through five of his works : I) Economic and Pliilosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844 (Paris Manuscripts); 2) "Theses on 
Feucrbach" (1845) ; 3) The German Ideology (1845-46) ; 
4) Grundrisse (1857-58); and Capital (1867) . 
The precendent for Marx's theory of alienation is found in 
the philosophy of G. W. F . Hegel and in the materialist critique of 
Hegel by Ludwig Feuerbach. In the chapter "Estranged Labour " 
in the Paris Manuscripts, Marx makes liberal use of the phrases 
"species-activity", "species-being", " h u m a n essence", e t c . These 
arc borrowed from Feuerbach w h o had presented his influential 
critique of Hegel in The Essence of Christianity (1841) . Hegel 
believed that there was a universal Absolute (Mind or Idea) and 
that man was Mind in a self-alienated state. The progression of 
history was a dialectical movement in which man increased his 
consciousness of the Idea. The development of man was the 
actualization of the Mind becoming fully "self-conscious", 
universally conscious. This was a philosophical and speculative 
conception of man. Feucrbach took a humanist ic approach in 
refuting Hegel's concept of the Idea as being metaphysically 
" a b o v e " man. He began by asserting that religion and the concept 
of God were simply the project ion and the consequent 
estrangement of man 's essence, i.e., his species-being, which was 
the sum total of the inherent nature of humans . These a t t r ibutes 
were the generic qualities of mankind . God was man 's being that 
has been externalized, objectified and now stands in opposi t ion to 
him. God was man in his self-alienation; God was man ' s 
relinquished self. Thus man is divided against himself, i.e., 
alienated. Hegel's concept of the Idea was criticized as also being a 
projection of species-being and thus no less theological. For Hegel, 
Mind (read "God" ) was being; man was the thought . However, 
with Feucrbach, man, specifically species-being, was the Absolute 
and God was the thought (Tucker 1967:85-89) . 
From Hegel, Marx ext rac ts the not ion of alienation as the 
separation of subject from itself, with this es t rangement existing 
dialcctically, in contradict ion. These antagonisms are a motive 
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force of human his tory . Through the influence of Feucrbach , 
Marx unders tands alienation as the domina t ion of a subject by an 
estranged object of its own creation. For Marx, this subject is m a n , 
specifically the worker , and the object is capital , including all i ts 
social relat ions. 
Estrangement in the labor activity, writes Marx in the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscript of 1844, involves first 
"The relation of the worker to the product of labour as an alien 
object exercising power over h ü n " (Marx and Engels, 1974 , 
v .3 :275) . The p roduc t that the worker creates is not his, bu t is 
appropr ia ted by the capitalist. This p roduc t stands opposed to him 
as capital . Second, " . . . labour is external t o the worker , i.e., it 
does not belong to his intrinsic na tu re ; . . . in his work , therefore 
he does not affirm himself bu t denies h imsel f . . . " (Marx and 
Engels 1974 , v .3 :274) . Marx held tha t man differs from animals in 
that he has consciousness. In his work he objectifies this 
consciousness, he duplicates himself in the world o f objects. Man's 
powers and " n a t u r e " are transformed into objects , into material 
creations. His skill, ingenuity, values, e tc . , become realized 
through this life activity. Unlike animals, men produce even in the 
absence of immedia te physical need. When an animal produces , its 
p roduc t is immediately used to fulfill a subsistence need; its 
activity is dic ta ted by instinct . Man produces willfully and 
confronts his p roduc t freely. This p roduc t has a use-value, i.e., it 
has the capaci ty t o satisfy a human wan t . Man decides h o w and 
when it is to be used. But wage labor reduces not only his p r o d u c t , 
but also his labor into a commodi ty tha t is control led by ano the r 
person. The p roduc t is no longer valued for its use, but for its 
worth on the marke t , i.e., its exchange-value. Labor, t o o , is 
transformed into a commodi ty because now it has exchange-value 
(wages) and becomes an abstract ion measured by m o n e y . Human 
capacities are abst racted and quantified through the assignment o f 
a moneta ry value. In unalienated labor use-value is created for its 
own sake, to be used. But in wage labor, value is created only to 
be t ransformed to exchange-value. A coat has a certain use-value, 
(t was produced by a man and it is an objectification of his labor . 
For example , its design, pa t te rn , color and in tended use reflects 
the worker ' s consciousness, while its craftsmanship reflects his 
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real, human powers. In capitalise product ion the coat is only 
valued for its exchange-value. The product is not control led by the 
workers, but by the capitalists. This p roduc t , capital , is no longer 
the workers ' but subordinates them for its own purposes . The 
design of the manufacturing process controls the workers , i.e., 
their labor conforms to the division of labor. Their mo t ions are 
not self-determined bu t directed by the capitalist who has 
purchased their labor, thus control l ing it and its p roduc t . The 
worker exchanges labor for the means of subsistence. Wage labor is 
a process of adaptat ion, of necessity, and therefore it is forced 
rather than voluntary. Labor is not an end, bu t a means . It is a 
"servant of the wage ." Cont inuing, Marx writes, 
Estranged labour turns thus: (3) Man's species-being . . . into a 
being alien to him, into a means for his individual existence . . . 
(4) An immediate consequence of the fact tiiat man is estranged 
from the product of his labour, his life activity, from his 
species being, is the estrangement of man from man (Marx and' 
Engels, 1974,v.3:277) . 
The meaning of "species-being" in this passage should not be 
unders tood in the Feuerbachian sense. In this same sect ion, Marx 
clearly defines it through the means o f a compar ison . 
. . . the productive life is the life of the species. It is 
life-engendering life. The whole character of a species-its 
specics-character-is contained in the character of its activity; and 
free, conscious activity is man's species-character . . . . The animal 
is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish 
itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself 
the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life 
activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. 
Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal 
life activity. It is just because of this that he is a specics-bcing 
(Marx and Engels. 1974, v.3:276). 
Except for an occassional occurrence in Grundrisse (Marx, 
1973 :243 , 496) Marx discont inues the use of "species-being" in 
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1 8 4 5 . In the German Ideology, however , he makes it known why 
he has altered his lexicon. 
. . . (T)he traditionally occuring philosophical expressions such as 
"human essence," "species-being,*' etc., gave the German 
theoreticians the desired reason for misunderstanding the real trend 
of thought and believing that here again it was a question of merely 
giving a new turn to their worn-out theoretical garment (Marx and 
Engels, 1974, v.5:236). 
If Marx had originally adop ted the Fcuerbachian not ion of 
h u m a n essence in tact , then his Paris Manuscripts could rightly be 
called ideological (or bourgeois) because they were based upon an 
idealist speculation as t o the metaphysical na ture of man . The 
manuscr ipts would also be fundamental ly different from his later 
works . Rather , Marx empirically observes that man ' s only nature is 
simply that he has a socially condi t ioned consciousness and that 
he proves this consciousness through labor. It is in the shaping of 
nature through work , the creation of a world of objects, that man 
proves his species-being, i.e., his humanness . T h u s species-being for 
Marx is not the species-being in the Feucrbachian usage. 
T h e consequence of estranged labor is man alienated from his 
species-being —he no longer produces in a way characteristic of the 
human species. Life has been reduced to an animal existence. The 
absence of such alienation would be a condi t ion in which he 
objectifies himself in all p roduc ts , in which these objects confirm 
and realize his individuality. They become his objects. Such 
potential can only be realized in society, man interacting with 
man. Marx writes in the Paris Manuscripts, 
. . . (W)hen I am active scientifically, etc. an activity which 1 can 
seldom perform in direct community with others-then my activity 
is social, because 1 perform it as a man. Not only is the material of 
my activity given to me as a social product (as is even the language 
in which the thinker is active): my own existence is social activity, 
and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for 
society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being. My 
general consciousness is only the theoretical shape ofthat of which 
27 
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the living shape is the real community, the social fabric, although at 
the present day general consciousness is an abstraction from real 
life and such confronts it with hostility (Marx and Engels, 1974, 
v.3:298). 
Human existence is social exis tence. Humans have 
consciousness and objectify it through labor. This consciousness is 
a social product in tha t it can only arise through the interact ion of 
men. As we have seen, wage labor alienates man from his p roduc t 
and his labor. The abstract ion, of human powers through money 
further alienates man from his species-being and from other m e n . 
Money itself becomes the social bond thus alienating man from 
man. Men no longer relate t o each o ther on the basis of real 
qualities, bu t rather according to abstract ions. "Thus what I am 
and am capable of is by no means determined by my 
individuali ty" (Marx and Engels, 1974 , v .3 :324) . Money turns the 
concrete ability of man into an alienated power belonging to its 
possessor. 
I am brainiest, but money is the real brain of all things and how 
then should its possessor be brainless.Besides, he can buy clever 
people for himself, and is lie who has power over the clever more 
clever than the clever . . . Docs not my money, therefore transform 
all my incapacities into their contrary? (Marx, 1974, v.3:324). 
Thus , in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 
1844, alienation is four-dimensional: Man is separated from his 
product , his labor, himself and o thers . Man is not alienated 
because wage labor separates him from his general abstract 
species-being. Rather , he is a social being that creates and 
appropriates nature in the forms of objects according to Iiis 
consciousness which is a result of social life. He is alienated when 
he is separated from these relat ionships. Man's life activity is 
conscious product ion, but the concepts , me thods , and materials 
arc presented as a given of a particular mode of existence that is 
social " . . -IJlust as society produces man as man, so is society 
produced by h i m " (Marx and Engels, 1974, v .3 :298) . 
Marx's Concept of Alienation 
In 1844 Marx expressed the importance of man 's activity in 
the material wor ld . Labor is an objectification o f his 
consciousness. This conceptual izat ion of the world was a result of 
human interact ion and thus a social " p r o d u c t . " In 1845 in the 
"Theses on Feuerbach , " these ideas appear in a concise, succinct 
form. Marx first criticizes Feuerbach for failing to see human 
activity as objective activity. Previous materialism had only 
considered the object of con templa t ion . Marx points ou t that 
through his activity man alters the environment and thus alters the 
objects of con templa t ion . T h u s , human activity mus t be 
considered as objective activity. He also very explicitly a t tacks 
Feuerbach ' s not ion that the essence of man is an abstract Absolute 
posited in isolated individuals. On the contrary , man 's essence is 
the ensemble of his social interact ions. Thus , the ' T h e s e s " entail a 
systematic clarification of ideas already in t roduced, and to be 
developed later. 
As in the Paris Manuscripts , passages in The German Ideology 
distinguish men from animals by their consciousness. Due to the 
polcmicalnature of this volume Marx's not ion o f consciousness 
may be misconstrued to mean that it is a simple mirror image or 
ideological reflex o f material life. Certain isolated passages may 
lend themselves to such an in terpre ta t ion , bu t this is a mistaken 
one . 
The production of ideas, of concepts, of consciousness, is at first 
directly interwoven with the material activity and the material 
intercourse of men-the language o f real life. Conceiving, thinking, 
the mental intercourse of men at this stage still appear as the direct 
efflux of their material behavior. The same applies to mental 
production expressed in the language of the politics, laws, morality, 
religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of 
their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real active men as they are 
conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces 
and of intercourse corresponding to t h e s e . . . (Marx and Eagles, 
1974, v.5:36). 
The confusion originates in an undialectical in terpre ta t ion . 
The formation of human awareness is not a one-way, causal 
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process. It arises ou t of social interact ion. Men are not merely 
products of their circumstances, they also create their 
circumstances. Consciousness is a social p roduc t only in tha t it can 
emerge exclusively from the intercourse of men . Since men are 
born into a society, they encounte r pre-existing material 
condit ions. Hence these condi t ions exist " independent ly of their 
wil l ." But this does no t lock them into determinism because they 
still enter into interact ion, developing their means of p roduc t ion . 
Consciousness is "at first" directly interwoven with material life. 
Marx establishes that when a certain stage of product ive capacities 
has developed a menta l division of labor occurs , allowing the 
emancipat ion of consciousness from the material wor ld . Whereas 
the idea of communism has been expressed many t imes 
th roughout history, the material elements of this revolut ion must 
be present for its actual realization. Marx also expresses this idea 
in Grundrisse, and later in Capital. 
The life-process of society, which is based on the process of 
material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is 
treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously 
regulated in accordance with a settled plan. This, however, 
demands for society a certain material groundwork or set of 
condit ions . . . (Marx and Engels, 1972:223). 
Marx held that m e n could be aware o f the dialectical process 
and change the world through revolutionary pract ice . Man is able 
to grasp his history as a process. If all consciousness was a material 
reflex then Marx would have to subject himself t o his own 
criticism. However, only ordinary consciousness is t o be criticized. 
Religion, metaphysics, mora l i ty , e tc . , were all types of ordinary 
consciousness, i.e., ideology. This was rejected as being the 
reflection of the material world because it was speculative, or as in 
Fcuerbach, because it failed to recognize h u m a n activity itself as 
objective activity. Marx 's basis was real, active men , empirically 
observed. 
Marx had broken with speculative phi losophy in the Paris 
Manuscripts. His emphasis had been upon real m a n in the material 
world. He broke with his philosophical lexicon in 1845 , criticizing 
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it in Tite German Ideology, while clarifying his ideas on historical 
materialism. The social relations that resulted in consciousness 
were now recognized as limited (rather than determined) by the 
condi t ions of the development of product ive forces. This follows 
from Marx's new materialistic concept ion that a certain 
organization of p roduc t ion is combined with a certain m o d e of 
coopera t ion , o r social relations with this social stage itself 
const i tut ing a product ive force. This aggregate of technological 
and social product ive forces thus shapes the condi t ion o f social 
interact ions. " . . . ( T j h e 'history of h u m a n i t y ' must always be 
studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and 
exchange" (Marx, 1974, v .5 :43) . T h e impor tance o f h u m a n 
activity as objective ("objectifying") activity had already been 
clarified in the "Theses . " In Tlie German Ideology men con t inue 
to be seen as the result of social relat ions. However, Marx n o w 
posits the basis of social intercourse in the particular historical 
stage o f social p roduc t ion . The shape o f men ' s interact ion has 
undergone a qualitative change through the discovery of historical 
material ism, bu t this is the logical ou tg rowth of his earlier 
concept ion of man as a social and productive being. 
While the origins of man 's "e s sence" have been clarified, the 
nature o f alienation remains essentially the same. In al ienat ion, as 
before, labor has lost the characteristic of being "self-activi ty" 
because material life becomes the end while labor is the means . 
Man now opposes his own product ive forces in an objectified and 
expropr ia ted form. These forces no longer belong to the workers , 
bu t to the capitalists. The worker is subordinated to the ex t r eme 
division of labor; he has become fragmented, abst racted, a l ienated. 
In the product ion process the worker ' s tasks are fragmented in to 
meaningless mo t ions . When money becomes the basis of 
interact ion, actual human powers are abstracted, i.e., d is tor ted . 
Thus the worker is estranged from his labor, his p roduc t , himself, 
and o the r men (Marx and Engles, 1974 , v .5 :86-87) . The four 
dimensions of alienation arc still present . The term "product ive 
forces" subst i tu ted for " l abour" is a more economist ic usage b u t it 
does not change the essential idea. This phrase anticipates a change 
that is realized by Marx around 1 8 5 7 . 
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We now leap a decade , mos t of which was a period of 
economic study for Marx, to Grundrisse. The work consists of a 
scries of seven no tebooks wri t ten be tween 1857 and 1868 
representing 15 years of economic s tudy . The no tebooks were 
wri t ten as a project of self-clarification and contain Marx's 
synthesis, the basic out l ine {"grundrisse ") of his mature economic 
thought . Upon these foundat ions Marx had projected a series of 
six books . Each b o o k was to be an e laborat ion of an aspect of his 
critique of political e c o n o m y . The volumes were to be wri t ten on : 
l )Capi ta l ; 2) Landed Proper ty ; 3) Wage Labour ; 4) the S ta te ; 
5) International Trade; and 6) World Market. The volumes of 
Capital represent a partial comple t ion of only one of these 
projects . For this reason Grundrisse gives insight into the whole of 
Marx's later development (see forward by Nicolaus in Marx, 
1973) . 
Bourgeois political e c o n o m y , and Marx's early economics , 
had been based upon the law of supply and demand and Ricardo 's 
theory of value. In this economic analysis the workers received a 
" fa i r" wage as determined by marke t prices. Capitalists and 
workers entered into a reciprocal exchange of commodi t i e s : wages 
were exchanged for labor. This labor was considered a commodi ty 
with an exchange-value like any o ther inanimate object . The 
advantage gained by one person over another was due to his 
superior skill and judgement in the marketp lace , not to any 
inherent social relationship. T h e value of labor was considered 
equal t o the wages it received; the relation be tween capital and 
labor const i tuted an exchange of equivalents. The value of labor 
(its ou tpu t , or product) supposedly was accurately expressed as 
wages. However, in this scheme neither the source of profit nor 
the tendency of capital to increase and concent ra te could be 
adequately explained. If the capitalist gained an advantage over 
the worker because of his efforts as a market-wise individual, how 
then did a society's capital accumula te in the hands of a capitalist 
class; (sec forward by Nicolaus in Marx, 1973) . 
In Grundrisse, Marx made an impor tan t economic discovery. 
Labor, he pointed ou t , was a unique commodi ty because it was 
value-creating activity. The phrase " labour p o w e r " signified this 
new concept ion. Labor power is a use-value for the capitalists 
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because of its capaci ty to create new exchange value. They are 
able t o use this un ique c o m m o d i t y , living labor power , t o create 
new value: objectif ied, s tored value, i.e., capital . For example , a 
capitalist purchases labor t o turn c o t t o n in to c lo th . The result ing 
value in this p roduc t ion process, the cloth itself, is sold to make a 
prof i t . In order t o make this profi t , the capitalist must first regain 
the costs of p roduc t ion ( the expense of the unspun co t ton , use o f 
the looms , etc .) as well as the cost of the wages paid to the 
workers . But according to the theory of surplus value, this t rade 
be tween capitalists and workers is an uneven one because the 
wages paid ou t have less value than the exchange-value that the 
latter have created. This difference is surplus value. It is tha t 
por t ion of capital created by the workers bu t expropr ia ted by the 
capitalists. For example , when it takes 6 hou r s for a worker t o 
produce exchange-value equivalent to his living needs and he is 
paid a living wage, then the 2 extra hours he works (assuming an 
8-hour day) becomes value for the capitalist . Surplus value is 
simply objectified surplus labor; it is tha t por t ion of capital 
produced by workers , bu t expropr ia ted by the capitalists. Once in 
their hands , it becomes new capital and thus the source of profi t . 
This relationship be tween capitalists and workers is a social 
relation, a m o d e of p roduc t ion and exchange inherent in the 
system of capitalism. 
When the worker enters into wage labor , the capitalist gains 
control of labor 's activity and its p roduc t . Marx states in 
Grundrisse: 
The product of labour appears as alien property, as a mode of 
existence confronting living labour as independent. . .and 
establishes itself opposite living labour as an alien power. . .(Marx, 
1973:453-4). 
As a consequence of the process of the accumulat ion of 
surplus value, it is the worker ' s own product , capital, tha t 
confronts them as s tored labor existing for the benefit and use of 
the capitalists. Since the capitalist class dominates the world of 
capital, it can, for the mos t par t , influence its distr ibution and use. 
Fur thermore , since the workers own no tools or o ther means of 
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product ion, they cannot survive wi thou t enter ing into a 
relationship with capital . In order to realize itself, labor must 
alienate itself. Capital s tands against the workers, objective labor 
against living labor, value against value-creating activity. As a 
consequence of all of this, the worker does not exist as an end in 
himself and for himself, bu t separated from and against himself. 
Living labour therefore now appears from its own standpoint as 
acting within the production process in such a way that, as it 
realizes itself in the objective conditions, it simultaneously repulses 
this realization from itself as an alien reality, and hence posits itself 
as insubstantial, as mere penurious labour capacity in the face of 
this reality alienated (entfremdet) from it, belonging not to it, but 
to others; that it posits its own reality not as a being for it, but 
merely as a being for others, and hence also as mere other-being 
(Anderssein), or being of another opposite itself (Marx, 1973:454) . 
In Marx's previous concept , the chief antagonism was 
between capital (which was a falsified manifestat ion of labor) and 
the real, natural social quali ty of labor as an objectification of 
man's life activity. His concept of alienation is given accuracy and 
depth by the discovery of capitalist p roduc t ion . With the theory 
of surplus value the chief antagonism is between s tored labor 
controlled by the capitalists subordinat ing living labor for its o w n 
u s e s - t h c expansion of value. Marx 's "ph i lo sophy" is qualified by 
his economics. The new emphasis on surplus value in Grundrisse is 
not to the exclusion of the previous antagonism, for the exchange 
relations o f wage labor are a necessary pre-condition and source of 
alienation. 
The general exchange of activities and products, which has become 
a vital condi t ion for each individual-their mutual 
interconnection-here appears as something alien to them, 
autonomous, as a thing. In exchange value, the social connection 
between persons is transformed into a social relation between 
things; personal capacity into objective wealth (Marx, 1973:157) . 
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In Grundrisse Marx 's concept of al ienation appears fully 
developed. Its four dimensions (separation o f the worker from his 
labor, p roduc t , himself, and others) are apparen t . He has n o t 
diminished his concept , bu t ra ther buil t upon it. His ma tu re 
economic theory leads to a more accurate model of capitalist 
al ienation. 
In Capital the men t ion o f al ienation is l imited, but n o t 
non-existent . Knowing, first of all, t h a t Marx discusses it in 
Grundrisse, and secondly, that it is in fact present in Capital 
proves that he had not abandoned it a l together . Of Marx's six 
projected books , one was to be on capital . It was to consist of four 
sect ions: a) capital in general ; b) compet i t ion ; c) credi t ; d) share 
capital , as the most comple te form (turning over in to 
communism) , together with its cont radic t ions . The first, "capi ta l 
in genera l" was to be subdivided in to : 1) Value; 2) Money; 
3) Capital . Thus the three extended volumes of Capital are the 
complet ion of only one section (''capital in general") of the first 
b o o k on capita] , which was to be the first of a series o f six b o o k s 
(see forward by Nicolaus in Marx, 1973) . Marx did no t e labora te 
on alienation in Capital because it was not the place to do so. The 
book on wage labor or the subdivision on the " turn ing over t o 
c o m m u n i s m " were such places. The discussions in Grundrisse, his 
out l ine , and to a limited degree in Capital prove tha t he still had 
the concept firmly in mind. 
When discussing alienation in Capital, Marx explicitly t reats 
the separation of the worker from his p roduc t and labor. 
First, the labourer works under the control of the capitalist to 
whom his labour belongs. . . . Secondly, the product is the property 
of the capitalist and not that of the labourer, its immediate 
producer. . .(Marx and Engels, 1972:238). 
Since before entering on the process, his own labour lias already 
been alienated from himself by the sale of his labour-power, has 
been appropriated by the capitalist and incorporated with capital, 
it must, during the process be realized in a product that does not 
belong to h im. . . . The labourer therefore constantly produces 
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material, objective wealth, but in the form of capital, of an alien 
power that dominates and exploits h im. . .(Marx, 1889:583). 
Only implicitly, in his concept of the fetishism of 
commodit ies does Marx present the aspect of alienation of men 
from men. It recalls earlier discussions critical of money and 
exchange relations. The world of commodi t ies , the relation of 
things to things in which products appear as sui'generis, is t e rmed 
the fetishism o f commodi t ies . 
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it 
the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective 
character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the 
relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is 
presented to them as a social relation, existing not between 
themselves but between the products of their labour (Marx, 
1889:42-3). 
Here we have the dimension of the estrangement of men 
from men. The fetishism of commodi t ies masks the social relations 
of man and sets up the relation between things. The value-relations 
of commodit ies do not have direct connect ion to their use-value. 
Men relate to each other on the basis o f abs t rac t ion , no t the real, 
material relation between themselves. The objectified labor of 
individuals is not a basis for their inter-relation because it has been 
transformed into capital. The existence of capital means the 
alienation of the worker from his p roduc t , his labor, and others . 
Notably absent is the est rangement of man from himself. But as 
already established. Capital cannot be considered a work on 
alienation, and since this dimension does appear in Marx's outl ine 
there is no reason to believe he discarded it. 
In conclusion, 1 would explain the development of Marx's 
thought as follows. In the Paris Manuscripts he presented his four 
dimensional concept of alienation which included a concept of 
human nature. The importance of man ' s practical activity in the 
world was emphasized. This activity involved the objectification of 
his consciousness through labor ; in turn this consciousness was 
considered to be a result of social interaction. In the "Theses on 
Marx's Concept of Alienation 
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Feu c rb ach " Marx clarifies the impor tance of h u m a n activity and 
deems it objective activity. Consciousness is again a t t r ibu ted to 
social in teract ion. In the German Ideology, he builds upon the 
idea that man is a social and product ive being, not ing that social 
activity itself is condi t ioned by the part icular development o f 
product ive forces. Throughou t this deve lopment , alienation is a 
function of being estranged from one ' s p roduc t , labor, himself and 
his social relat ionships. This is a result of capitalist exchange 
relations. In Grundrisse Marx makes the discovery of surplus value, 
thus adding dep th to the concept of al ienation. It is a more 
accurate and complete s t a t emen t of the process of estrangement in 
capitalist p roduc t ion . Whereas before wage labor was criticized as 
alienating due to t ransformat ion of objective relationships into 
abstract ones , Grmic/risse po in t s ou t additionally the oppos i t ion of 
value to living labor. The concept of alienation remains four 
dimensional , bu t the basis is more fully developed, reflecting the 
matura t ion of Marx's economics . Capital is a painstaking 
elaborat ion as to the nature of capital in general , no t to be 
considered a full t rea tment of al ienation. It presupposes previous 
work , especially Grundrisse, and cannot be viewed o u t of this 
con tex t . The thought of Karl Marx should be seen as a con t inuous 
expansion and clarification of ideas first put forth in 1844 . His 
development in economics suppor t s and qualifies his assertions of 
a more philosophical na ture . The early and later works should 
neither be considered as having complete cont inui ty nor complete 
incompatibi l i ty, for the later grew ou t of the earlier. 
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